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Military Bases and Conservation Markets 
 
Over time, DoD is likely to be one of the largest buyers and sellers in a water quality 
trading market.  The Department of Defense (DoD) operates military bases that resemble 
small cities in infrastructure.  As units redeploy, bases are likely to find themselves well 
within their environmental limits at the originating base and potentially bumping against 
limits such as nitrate and phosphate loading at the destination base.  Stricter rules and 
heavier loadings in growing watersheds also present challenges to local bases and 
municipalities as regulators clamp down on loadings from existing Waste Water 
Treatment Plants (WWTPs) to meet water quality standards.    For example, removal of a 
pound of phosphate in a WWTP using an engineered tertiary treatment can cost over 
$300 per pound while reduction of a pound of phosphate loading from a farm field in the 
same watershed can often be achieved for $4-$6 per pound.  In addition, many of the 
externalities for engineered treatment (e.g., capital costs, greenhouse gas footprint) are 
negative while externalities for improved agricultural practices like grassed buffer strips 
(e.g., wildlife habitat, carbon sequestration) are positive.   When conservation trading and 
nutrient trading becomes routine, large cost savings with concurrent preservation of high 
quality watershed ecosystems are possible.   
 
The public has a clear interest in water and environmental quality and our society accepts 
the premise that those who flush a toilet need to pay for the resulting services needed 
whether these services are provided by man or nature.  Traditionally, public utilities have 
borne the brunt of cost and regulatory scrutiny required to achieve acceptable water 
quality.  While most of these services have had an engineering flavor, many utilities 
utilize a variety of ‘natural’ treatments to polish or otherwise treat water.  In this sense, a 
‘Natural Utility Department’ provides services such as nutrient removal, flood control, 
etc., typically at quantifiable prices below those currently paid.  It is fully possible today 
for any utility to estimate the marginal cost of nutrient removal using a given engineering 
treatment and the cost using land treatment and put them side by side on a utility bill and 
educate rate payers, voters, and potential market participants about the consequences of 
selecting a market approach.  
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 Poor accounting of the externalities borne by our public utilities and military bases and of 
the externalities provided by our ecosystems has created large economic inefficiencies.  
Negative externalities associated with expensive engineered solutions will increase with 
encroachment and population growth.  A pure engineering response to these negative 
externalities would require greatly increased capital expenditures and O&M.   Positive 
externalities will correspondingly diminish as millions of acres of land each year are 
converted to roads and waste-producing subdivisions. 
 
A practical market approach must first be able to ‘stack’ water quality or other ecosystem 
services on a parcel of land and then derive component values using the market tools of 
financial derivatives.   To stack means to pay a landowner to implement one or more land 
use practices that have different benefits to different buyers.  While ‘stacking’ is used in 
environmental market discussions, ‘derivatives’ is used in financial markets.  A 
derivative is a financial instrument that derives its value from the value of other financial 
instruments or an underlying asset such as land, a commodity, stock or bond.  For 
example, along agricultural lands near a base, the base could pay a farmer for reducing 
phosphate loading to the river while a land trust could pay for a biking trail/conservation 
easement on the same parcel of land.   A third party might purchase carbon sequestration, 
flood control, hunting and/or wetland mitigation on the same land parcel.  Thus, stacking 
provides a mechanism to align different but complementary objectives.  The economic 
efficiency implied by this is straightforward.   
 
Markets will not automatically work because the environment could benefit and money 
could be saved.   The key decision makers today on whether to take a market approach 
are those responsible for military and civilian WWTPs.   Public works directors and their 
military counterparts did not become heads of large well-capitalized organizations by 
taking large chances or making mistakes.  In general, WWTPs are probably 
overcapitalized in terms of returns on public investment because it minimizes 
management headaches and few complain about an extra dollar or two on a monthly 
utility bill.   This same pragmatic caution also makes them reluctant to get out in front on 
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a market approach where the risk is high and public response uncertain.  Somewhat 
ironically this avoidance of risk by increased capitalization increases the potential market 
savings.  The key conclusion here is that policy and market makers must take into 
account the needs and drives of local decision makers to construct a successful market. 
 
A properly structured market helps align utilitarian and environmental investments and 
leads to public and environmental ‘buy in’.   Even the environmentally insensitive will 
endorse purchase of natural utility services if they are cheaper.  From the perspective of 
WWTP operators that must make these approaches work, risk of project failure can be 
reduced with widespread involvement and benefit.  Those with larger environmental 
objectives can best advance them by selling the ‘natural utility’ component of their 
purchase to a base or municipal utility and using their resources to procure additional 
lands or easements focusing on their core interest (e.g., a bicycle path, a conservation 
easement or a better ecosystem).  Money is both saved and better invested with higher 
rates of public and private return.   
 
We intend to develop a market framework that provides visible and quantifiable 
environmental and financial results to the public.  Underpinning these web-based 
stacking and derivitization tools will be precalculated results from existing agency natural 
resource models (e.g. numerical models like RUSLE or Revised Universal Soil Loss 
Equation) linked to sites with financial derivitization tools to capture ecosystem service 
externalities.  A third party assessment of natural utility or ecosystem service provided 
from a land parcel using agency models leads to a quantification of the value of a practice 
in concentration, mass or other unit.  These units, in turn, are the basis for an efficient 
market with standardized financial derivatives and reduced transaction costs.   
 
We can deliver water quality and conservation trading tools to military bases and 
municipalities that provide simplified asset management, appropriately shared 
information with other market participants including regulators, reduced capital 
investments in wastewater infrastructure, and publicly tangible environmental 
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improvements.  Market approaches for air quality trading have already proven to be a 
success. 
 
A conservation or natural utility market, more than any existing market, depends upon 
effective communication of geospatial information.  Thus, this concept paper ends with 
an example of a market transaction using screenshots from a hypothetical web-based 
market platform.  Under each screenshot, a short narrative explains the picture. 
 
Mark Ankeny 
Idaho National Laboratory 
mcankeny@gmail.com
208.526.5748 
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http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
 
This screenshot is of Albuquerque, NM showing an urban-rural-riparian interface from 
zillow.com.  It is a good example of geospatial information presented with a good user 
interface that answers the “What’s in it for me?” question.  While this focuses on land 
parcels with homes, this platform and others similar to it could be used for conservation 
or ecosystem service markets. 
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This screenshot is a zoom in from the previous screen.  It shows estimated home values 
as calculated by zillow in an urban-rural-riparian interface.   Undeveloped parcels, 
associated parcel information, existing agency models, and a brokerage interface would 
create a foundation for a conservation marketplace. 
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 http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
Evaluate Land Management Options
Continuous Row Crops
Precision Farming
Native Vegetation
No Till
Select Management Practices: X
 
This is a screenshot of an urban-rural interface near Boise, ID with the Boise River and 
an irrigation canal shown.  It is meant to be illustrative of an encroaching urban 
environment.  The highlighted parcel of land has several management options that the 
landowner would consider undertaking in a conservation or natural utility market.  Each 
option has different market consequences.  The following example scenarios and all 
associated numbers for this illustration are made up.  
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http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
Warm Springs Land Trust Bicycle Path Derivatives Screen
82
5 44
Estimated Market Value: $6,220 Records: 3
Parcel Phosphate Reduction Carbon Sequestration Wetland Mitigation
19 $200 0 0
34 $800 $100 $1500
76 $1000 $120 $2500
76
19
34
 
This screenshot shows an orange line where the Warm Springs Land Trust is trying to 
acquire conservation easements that would also allow a bicycle path along an irrigation 
canal.  Perhaps the bike trail itself will act as a berm to intercept overland and reduce 
phosphate loading. Easements from owners of parcels 19, 34, and 76 would need to be 
acquired.  As part of the buyer’s analysis, the platform has estimated the value of the 
financial derivatives they intend to sell to other users in the table:  phosphate to the Boise 
WWTP, carbon on the market might go to an oil company, and wetland mitigation to the 
Idaho Department of Transportation to offset environmental effects of road building in a 
rapidly urbanizing area. 
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http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
Warm Springs Land Trust Bicycle Path Order Status Screen
82
5 44
76
19
34
Conditional Bid Outstanding
Total: $10,000
Parcel Bid Status Modify Bid
19 $1000 accepted Closed
34 $4000 rejected
76 $5000 accepted Closed
$5000
X
 
After evaluating the value of the derivatives they can sell or wish to sell (in this case 
carbon, phosphate, and wetlands mitigation) and their available budget to acquire 
easements for a bicycle trail, the Land Trust opens up conditional bidding as shown on 
the screenshot above.  The offer is contingent on all three owners accepting a bid because 
an interrupted bike path is of no value to the Land Trust.  The owners of parcel 19 and 76 
have accepted the land trust offer for a conservation easement knowing bicycle paths 
typically increase property values.  The owner of parcel 34 is perhaps a not atypical rural 
landowner that doesn’t want to be bothered.    In this case, the Land Trust has increased 
its bid for parcel 34.  It may still be rejected, but alternative pathways, both physical and 
sociological, can be considered.  Alternative pathways through different parcels are likely 
to preclude the neighbors from cashing in on an easement.  Given that rural neighbors 
have often lived side by side for generations and go the same schools, churches, and civic 
functions, it is very likely conversations about the merits of cooperating to cash checks 
for conservation easements and natural utility payments will take place.  Markets are used 
to help align utilitarian and environmental interests to achieve literal and visual ‘buy-in’.    
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http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
LegendLegend
Market Structure
Projects/Buyers
Boise WWTP
Fisheries & Wildlife
Warm Springs Land Trust
Projects/Buyers
Boise WWTP
Fisheries & Wildlife
Warm Springs Land Trust
Mgt. Practices AvailableMgt. Practices Available Parcels/Sellers
5, 44, 34, 82, 76
44, 82
19, 34, 76
Parcels/Sellers
5, 44, 34, 82, 76
44, 82
19, 34, 76
Easement
Vegetation
No-Till
Precision Farming
 
To generalize the market problem, there are multiple buyers who wish to derive various 
benefits from a parcel of land and multiple sellers who can select from among mutually 
exclusive land management practices.  In addition to the spatial and management issues, 
there are temporal issues for central planning with farm, water, state, and federal fiscal 
years often varying state by state.  Using scientifically validated agency models to 
estimate the land-derived service provided and a market to price these derived services as 
financial derivatives appears to be the only practical path forward.   
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http://www.idahoconservationmarket.com
Idaho Conservation Market
Regulatory Oversight
Parcel: 82
Owner: Farmer Dave
Compliant: No
BMPs Purchased             Contracted Phosphate Reduction
No Till               100 lbs
Comments:
Moldboard plowing observed
Verification Report Send NOV
Edit
Parcel: 76
Owner: John Doe
Compliant: Yes
BMPs Purchased            Contracted Phosphate Reduction
Bike Path                         50 lbs
Plant Grass                      60 lbs
Comments:
Edit
X
X
 
A natural utility market will also require verification and regulation.  A visually-oriented 
electronic market is well suited to these requirements.  Verification will be primarily 
based upon third-party low-cost high-resolution aerial photography.  A regulator will see 
a screen something like the above where parcel owner 82 is not in compliance.  The 
regulator can review the compliance documentation and, if needed, send a Notice of 
Violation (NOV) as shown above.   Such a platform also serves as the basis for many 
innovative watershed management approaches.   
 
This short visual introduction to natural utility markets is an example of how market 
microstructure (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_microstructure for details) can 
be designed.   In short, market microstructure concerns the nuts and bolts of putting 
together and running a market to achieve a larger public good.  Market microstructure is 
also sensitive to the need for market players to be profitable for a viable market to exist. 
Brokers, market makers and regulatory oversight will be needed. 
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